Introduction
The Treaty on European Union 1 created the second pillar that deals with common foreign and security policy 2 . The five objectives of the EU CFSP are: the safeguarding of the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; the strengthening of the security of the Union in all ways; the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security; the promotion of international cooperation and, finally, the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 3 . The objectives set out in the TEU are intricately linked to the notion of conflict prevention which dates back to the Treaties establishing the European Coal and Steal Community 4 and the European Atomic Energy Community 5 which had the goal of using the means of production of warfare for peaceful purposes.
The Council of the European Union is presently in the process of establishing three new permanent political and military bodies in order to progressively frame a common defence policy 6 and achieve the aforementioned objectives. The standing Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff will work together in order to enforce the Union's security and defence policy 7 . The TEU enumerates several "tasks" that fall within this framework such as humanitarian missions, rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat in crisis management including peacemaking 8 . The execution of said tasks by armed forces acting on behalf of the Union in armed conflicts could engage the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 9 . The International Criminal Court was created to bring an end to impunity and prevent the commission of the most serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law 10 . The principle of individual criminal responsibility for both commanders and subordinates was established at Nuremberg in order to assure that those responsible for the atrocities of World War II would be brought to justice. This was also the driving force behind the creation of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by the UN Security Council. The ICC will have a direct impact in the political decisions of the Union regarding the forms of intervention it chooses as well as the military decisions taken on the field by commanders.
The European Union
Although the Statute of the International Criminal Court does not bind the European Union, it is in the Union's best interest that the treaty be ratified by all Member States in order for them to effectively have a common policy in terms of their international obligations when engaging in tasks for the Union. The degree of variance in the Member States' approach thus far may have important consequences on the Union's common foreign and security policy and its role in the prevention of armed conflicts. The following essay compares and contrasts the positions of the European Council and Parliament regarding the International Criminal Court. It illustrates the European Union's indirect role in the development of the ICC through the support and funding of Nongovernmental Organisations 13 with that specific purpose. It highlights the controversial issues at the Rome Diplomatic Conference that involved EU Member States. On key issues, some of them adopted attitudes that clearly protected their individual interests, thus negatively affecting the outcome in Rome. Furthermore, it describes the developments since the Rome Conference. Finally, it outlines some future considerations regarding the relationship between European Union and the ICC.
I. The European Council's position
At the beginning of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, the Presidency of the European Council announced several important principles to which the Member States were committed 14 . It presented a "reasonable middle-of-the-road position"
15 and all the principles contained therein were incorporated in the ICC Statute.
The Council held that the Court should be universal and effective yet be complementary to national jurisdictions. In principle it should be an independent institution yet in relationship with the United Nations. Its prosecutor should be independent from governments. Also, the crimes under its jurisdiction should include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the crime of aggression to the extent that the Security Council's role in the maintenance of international peace and security would not be compromised. Moreover, war crimes should cover both international and internal armed conflicts as well as gender-related crimes. The Security Council should have a right of referral to the Court in situations where crimes under the Court's jurisdiction may have been committed. The Court should have the power to award reparations to victims. The Statute's sentencing provisions should not include the death penalty. Finally, the European Council stressed the importance of the establishment of an effective state cooperation system with the mandatory obligation to comply with requests for assistance by the Court 16 .
II. The Compatibility of the Council's position with that of the European Parliament
The position taken by the European Union's presidency was more conservative than the European Parliament's. Evidently, the two entities have clearly distinct points of view and concerns given the fact that the European Council represents the governments of the Members of the Union whereas the Parliament represents the European peoples. Although the Council is not bound by the Parliament's resolutions, the Presidency is supposed to consult the Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of common foreign and security policy and ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration 17 . Given the fact that the ICC will have a direct bearing on soldiers acting on behalf of the EU in the context of CFSP, the European Parliament's resolutions are relevant.
In a resolution it adopted in the opening days of the Diplomatic Conference, the European Parliament, in light of its previous resolutions on the matter, spelled out its position regarding the ICC, which differed somewhat from to that of the Council 18 .
The Parliament indicated that in order for the Court to represent "an effective complement to national judicial systems" 19 , it had to provide for an independent prosecutor. However, its position was more explicit in requiring that the prosecutor possess the power to initiate and conduct investigations on an own-initiative basis, thus reaffirming its earlier contention of the prosecutor Regarding the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction, the Parliament held that the Court had to have universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes without any "state consent" requirement 22 . During the Preparatory Committee discussions and at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, the German delegation campaigned for the Court to have universal jurisdiction 23 . Unfortunately, most of the Delegations at Rome were above all concerned with protecting their State sovereignty. As a result, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over crimes that either occur on the territory of a State party or are perpetrated by one of its nationals 24 .
The Parliament also affirmed that the Court should have a "constructive" relationship with the United Nations and particularly with the Security Council, in full recognition of their respective roles and competences 25 (the Parliament had indicated in previous resolutions that the Court must be strong and independent and not subject to vetoes by the United Nations Security Council 26 ). Also, the Parliament's resolution stated that the Court should itself judge its competence on questions of admissibility 27 , which was later codified in article 17 of the Statute.
Furthermore, the European Parliament reiterated its previous position 28 , again a more progressive one with respect to that of the presidency of the European Council, in that the ICC should not only protect the victims' Finally, the Parliament stressed the importance of long-term financing of the ICC in order to ensure both the self-reliance and independence of the Court 33 .
III. Actions of NGO's Supported by the European Union
The EU budget line B7-706 34 was created with the goal of providing technical assistance to the ICTY and ICTR, providing financial support for the preparatory work for the setting up and the functioning of the ICC as well as training the staff of the Tribunals in field of gender mainstreaming, for instance. From 1996 to 1998 it averaged 3 million euros, most of which was in support of NGO activities 35 .
At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there were 236 NGOs with an estimated 450 people at their disposal, and although they would not sit at the negotiation tables, they were clearly the largest delegation there 36 The Coalition established a network of international law experts in order to take a stance regarding important legal and political issues raised by the proposed Statute 40 . Moreover, the Coalition's various divisions met with representatives of governments and of the UN involved in the negotiations in order to exchange views and raise their level of awareness for instance on gender issues, the rights of victims, peace and disarmament, protection of children and matters of faith 41 . The Coalition also established an electronic information system tracking events and conferences around the world and listing written publications on the Court 42 .
No Peace Without Justice began campaigning in 1996 in order to set a date for the holding of the Rome Conference on the establishment of the ICC and it launched an International Appeal, which was signed by more than 30 global leaders 43 . Ms Emma Bonino, who was at the time the European Commissioner on Humanitarian Aid, headed the entire campaign. After the UN General Assembly set the dates of the Rome Conference, NPWJ then launched in 1997 a new International Appeal demanding the establishment of the ICC by 1998 at the latest 44 . In order to add to the momentum and to mobilize public opinion, it organised a series of conferences during 1997 and 1998, mostly cochaired by Ms Bonino, in Malta, Siracusa (Italy), Montevideo (Uruguay), Atlanta, Rome, New York UN headquarters, Dakar (Senegal), and again in Rome held on the days preceeding the commencement of the Diplomatic Conference 45 . It also held a series of seminars in universities and other institutions from 1996 to 1998 in Rome, New York, Palermo (Italy), Cagliari Other NPWJ initiatives at the Rome Diplomatic Conference included various public addresses, a candlelight march across Rome, the publication of newspapers and newsletters 47 , and the establishment of a judicial assistance programme providing legal expertise to delegations from various African and other developing countries 48 .
IV. The controversies at the Rome Conference
The European Union's position on the key principles that had to be reflected in the ICC Statute was shared by several of the like-minded states 49 at the Conference. However, there was great divergence among the positions of the individual Member States of the Union on issues over which the Council had not pronounced itself. Although it can be argued that the issues on which the European Council does not pronounce itself are not a part of the Union's CFSP, it would be practically undesirable for the Member states to adopt contradictory positions on such important issues.
The Member States are obligated to coordinate their action at international conferences and to uphold the Union's common positions in such fora 50 . For instance, both France and the United Kingdom, being permanent members of the Security Council, protected their distinct interests above all. Under the TEU they have the obligation to ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter 51 . Thus, several of the provisions that were arrived at through compromise in Rome, would be deemed unsatisfactory by NGOs. The issues that directly involved the permanent Members of the Security Council regarded the crime of aggression, the war crimes opt-out provision, prohibited means and methods of warfare and the Security Council's right of deferral.
a) The crime of aggression
Article 5 of the Rome Statute indicates that the Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The inclusion of the first three crimes was undisputed 52 , yet the crime of aggression was more controversial and was dealt with separately in Rome.
The argument in favour of including of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute was based primarily on the fact that the Charter of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal provided for what were then referred to as "crimes against peace" 53 , and therefore not including aggression would be retrogressive and inconsistent with international law 54 .
It was decided at the Preparatory Committee negotiations that the crime of aggression would be defined by a general definition containing criteria of the crime. This approach was favoured over the two alternatives which were on the one hand a general definition combined with a list of acts of aggression 55 and on the other hand no definition at all, relinquishing the matter to the Security Council in every case 56 .
Of the three proposed definitions of aggression, the one put forward by Germany was the most supported during the Preparatory Committee negotiations. However, it was deemed too restrictive by some delagations at the Diplomatic Conference 57 . Germany had attempted to take an objective approach in defining aggression with the most obvious criteria by focussing on the existence of an armed attack against a State's territorial or political independence in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations. This definition also allowed the choice as to the object of the aggression, being the establishment of an occupation (military or otherwise), or the annexation of a territory 58 .
The delegations opposed to the German proposal favoured a broader definition and wished to include firstly the deprivation of "peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence" 59 , and secondly "resorting to armed force to threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State or the inalienable rights of those people" 60 .
Moreover, all five permanent Members of the Security Council took the position that their role in determining an act of aggression as stated in the Charter of the United Nations 61 was a conditio sine qua non for its inclusion in the Statute 62 .
The debate remained until the very end of the Conference 63 regarding the extent of the Security Council's role in defining the crime itself and in relation to the Court's application thereof. The Court under the ILC Draft Statute dealt with the crime of aggression subject to the prior determination by the Security Council of the existence of a said act. Although this option was strongly supported by all five permanent Members at Rome 64 , it sparked concerns over the independence of the Court and the right to a fair trial of persons accused.
A definition to the crime of aggression was not reached at the diplomatic conference. However, the second paragraph of Article 5 states that the Court 
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shall exercise jurisdiction over this crime once a provision is adopted 65 , defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, it indicates that the adopted provision "shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" 66 .
b) War crimes opt-out
The Statute permits derogation from the Court' s competence over war crimes for a period of seven years 67 . This provision was an alternative suggestion by the French delegation 68 to its original requirement of an opt-in provision regarding war crimes 69 .
Although at first glance the opt-out provision might seem insignificant to some, it is important to stress that the war crimes contained in the Rome Statute apply to both international and internal armed conflicts 70 in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as a large-scale commission of such crimes 71 . Also, the war crimes provisions cover a wider spectrum than crimes against humanity and genocide because they have a lengthier list of illegal acts. A war crime has less strict requirements in terms of its constituent elements in comparison to a crime against humanity for instance, which must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack 72 .
c) Prohibited means and methods of warfare
The ICC Statute sets a general prohibition on the employment of weapons and other methods of warfare, deemed to be violations of the laws and customs of war, applicable in international armed conflicts: Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of the nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering of which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123 73 .
In addition, the Statute also has specific prohibitions namely on the use of poison or poisoned weapons 74 , the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices 75 and the employment of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body 76 .
There is in effect an overlap between the general and specific prohibitions. The advantage of the general prohibition is that it covers means and methods of warfare that are not explicitly enumerated in the other provisions of Article 8, such as antipersonnel mines 77 . However, this argument is moot because the means and methods of warfare outlawed by the general prohibition are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are to be included within an annex to the statute by an amendment. The Statute can be amended either through consensus or by a two-thirds majority when consensus cannot be reached, only seven years after it came into force 78 . Also, States Parties must ratify any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the ICC Statute in order to be bound by it 79 .
In effect, the Statute does not outlaw the employment of weapons of mass destruction because the annex does not exist. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there was much controversy over the inclusion of the use of biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons in the Statute:
[...] a no-list approach proved unacceptable, and a list including nuclear weapons likewise proved unacceptable. However, as reactions to the Bureau Proposal demonstrated, excluding nuclear weapons while listing other weapons of mass destruction was equally unacceptable. There was adamant opposition to a provision excluding the 'rich man' s weapons of destruction' (nuclear weapons) while prohibiting the 'poor man' s weapons of destruction' (biological and chemical weapons). It was feared that prohibiting some weapons of mass destruction while remaining silent on nuclear weapons would give tacit approval to the legality of nuclear weapons 80 .
The first two types of weapons are subject to prohibitions in international law 81 , however there exist no worldwide international conventions prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. There are on the other hand regional instruments that prohibit the use of such weapons 82 as well as treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 83 . There is no clear evidence at present of an emerging international customary rule.
Moreover, the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons stated that it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake 84 .
The issue was extremely sensitive for the permanent members of the Security Council as well as many members of NATO. If the ICC Statute were to prohibit such weapons, it might have given the entire process a fatal blow 85 , and therefore, as a gesture of compromise, Article 8 (2) (b) (xx) was adopted which is very limited and certainly ineffective.
d)
The Security Council's right of deferral
As mentioned above, the European Council favoured a prosecutor that would be independent from the States. In addition, it indicated that the Security Council should have a right of referral to the Court in situations where crimes under the Court's jurisdiction may have been committed. The European Parliament also wanted an independent prosecutor with the power to initiate investigations on his or her own initiative. The inclusion of statutory provisions for an independent Prosecutor with powers to target situations on his or her own motion was received with concern by some but was hailed by many as a major step for in the establishment of an effective, impartial and credible Court 91 .
There was evidently an incompatibility on the one hand with the role of an independent Prosecutor and on the other with the Security Council's role in authorising the commencement of a prosecution in situations dealt by it under Chapter VII as set out in the ILC Draft Statute 92 . Any permanent Member could unilaterally prevent the commencement of a prosecution with its veto 93 . A proposal put forward by Singapore, reversing the Draft Statute's formulation, was accepted and now stands as Article 16 of the ICC Statute, which states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions 94 .
The application of this provision can conceivably impede the administration of justice by the Court given the fact that a deferral of twelve months may cause the loss of important evidence related to the commission of the crime. The rules of procedure and evidence 95 are silent on the question of interim measures in order to preserve evidence, in the case of a deferral. However, the deferral of an investigation or prosecution can only occur if a resolution is adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter namely in the occurrence of an act of aggression or a threat to international peace and security, which not only requires the approval of all five permanent Members of the Security Council but also requires a total of nine out of the fifteen votes 96 .
V. Developments following the adoption of the ICC Statute
The European Council regulations on the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 97 were created as suggested by the Comité des Sages report of 1998 98 , in response to the ECJ decision of the 12 May 1998 99 , implementing measures of conflict prevention, support for peace initiatives and addressing the issue of impunity 100 , in consistency with the Union's common foreign and security policy 101 .
They provide the legal authority for preventing, resolving and dealing with the consequences of conflict, including support for establishing Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and setting up a permanent International Criminal Court, as well as support and assistance for the victims of human rights Moreover, the Council of the European Union has consistently stated in a number of its responses that most of the Member States are subject to the various legislative and/or constitutional steps in proceeding with ratification and should complete the process in the near future 113 .
In contrast, the European Parliament has consistently supported and congratulated the States that have ratified the ICC Statute and has urged the Member States of EU 114 and the applicant countries that have not ratified the Statute to do so 115 .
Conclusion
The European Union must continue its efforts in promoting democratisation, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Both the European Council and the European Parliament have indicated that the speedy ratification of the ICC Statute is a priority. Thus the European Council should closely monitor the progress on this issue. However, a number of other existing measures exist that should be taken by the European Union.
Moreover, the role of the European Council's High Representative for common foreign and security policy 118 , Mr PESC, both individually and in the context of Troika 119 , is crucial for effective crisis management 120 and conflict prevention 121 . This would imply monitoring the state of human rights throughout the world, cooperating with organisations seeking the enhancement of human rights, promoting human rights policies as well as responding to violations 122 .
Also, the provisions of the European Council regulations on the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, provide for reactive measures in emergency situations, presumably by the EU rapid reaction forces. Thus, measures are deemed to be necessary in cases where an urgent and unforeseeable need arises from the sudden suspension of the democratic process or the emergence of a state of crisis or exceptional and imminent danger affecting all or part of the population of a country and posing a grave threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual 123 . However, coordination In effect, the European Council's interpretation of these regulations and its political willingness will determine the extent to which the Union will, for instance, intervene on humanitarian grounds in a conflict. However, the Council must ensure unity, consistency and effectiveness of action 125 . Evidently the fact that the ICC will have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression will have a direct impact on the decision-making process of the EU in terms of its common foreign and security policy. However, the effective support to the ICC by the European Union is the best way for it to set an example and is the true test of determining whether the positions held weren't "euro-rhetoric".
Therefore the EU must take the initiative in the PrepCom negotiations in order for a definition of aggression to be reached, which will serve as an objective definition to evaluate alleged acts thereof, and constrict the highly political approach to the situation in the present scenario. Moreover, a definition of aggression would also be a deterrent where in some cases the crime is committed yet disguised and qualified as something else.
Beyond acting as a deterrent, the International Criminal Court will encourage States to respect and ensure respect of International Humanitarian Law. The primary obligation to prosecute violations of IHL reposes on the Member States. The Union would not be able to initiate a prosecution because it is not a State and therefore is not bound by the ICC treaty. However, situations can occur where the EU Member States would be unwilling to prosecute an individual for any reason. For example, when peacekeepers acting on behalf of EU Member States committed acts of sexual violence in Somalia and
